

What do Australians think about globalization? public and personal dimensions

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Introduction

Globalization in one shape or form continues to attract interest and engagement among citizens and scholars alike. Among citizens there is both hostility towards and support for different aspects of the multiple processes that go to make up globalization (Holton 2005), such as free trade, migration, and exchange of cultural ideas and practices (Bean 2002; Holton and Phillips 2001; Smith and Phillips 2006). Yet we still know very little about how far opinion is divided ‘for’ or ‘against’, and whether this differs between men and women, young and old, richer and poorer, and a range of other social indicators. Nor do we know whether people welcome some features of globalization and dislike others. Finally it is also unclear how far attitudes about globalization, considered in the abstract, carry forward into, or are inconsistent with everyday behavior. Do Australians who are more positive about globalization, for example, actually participate in global processes, more than those who do not?

For many social scientists today, globalization is a key idea for understanding what is novel and distinct about contemporary societies (Held *et al.* 1999; Holton 2005). Recent studies in sociological theory have highlighted the ‘human consequences’ (Bauman 1998) and the ‘emotional costs’ (Elliott and Lemert 2006) of large-scale processes of globalization. These works offer persuasive visions and interpretations of the directions in which globalization as a large scale process is reconfiguring inequalities, identities and affects. Yet, the lived experience of globalization has been the subject of little dedicated study in the social sciences. As a result, knowledge of how globalization shapes individual lives remains tentative and undeveloped.

In moving from abstract generalities to the lived experience of globalization, it is useful to follow C. Wright Mills' (1959) distinction between globalization as a 'public issue' and as a 'personal problem'. As a 'public issue', individuals may apprehend globalization through exposure to politics and mass media discourse about the relationships between Australia and diverse countries, peoples, and cultural practices. Yet, as a 'personal problem', individuals may typically encounter globalization first-hand through routine experiences of sharing public space, in Australia and through work and travel overseas, with different types of people and ways of life. In effect, what we are suggesting here is that the individual experiences globalization in a layered way, as a simultaneous feature of both public and personal life.

Such experiences are not new. Post white-settlement Australia has a long history of immigration, and economic, political and inter-cultural engagement with those beyond its borders. Both public issues and personal problems have been affected by cross-border influences and mobilities over a long period. In the context of more intensified processes of globalization, however, it is highly relevant to ask what citizens and residents think about the prospect of an Australia that is more and more connected with diverse nations, peoples and ways of life? How do they feel about the possibility of their everyday lives in public being increasingly lived amongst people who seem to be from somewhere else, different to here, beyond Australian borders? Above and beyond these two questions, is there a link between what people think about globalization as a 'public issue' and as a 'personal problem'? By looking into these questions in the current Chapter, we hope to try and understand more about how Australians today feel themselves about globalization.

Receptiveness to global interconnections between nations

A central feature of globalization is growing interconnectedness across national borders. A basic principle at work here is that as globalization accelerates, interrelationships between nations and people within them will extend and intensify. How might we expect this kind of transformation of larger global networks of national ties to play out when looked at from a specifically Australian vantage point? What globalization theory draws our attention to is the prospect that as Australia shifts further into the new century, so too will it become increasingly immersed in complex webs of relations with other nations. According to this vision, Australians will mix more and more with

countries and peoples through relationships that take place outside of network of national ties (Albrow 1998).

The question of the complexion of Australian's web of national affiliations is a major topic in the ongoing public conversation today about the problems and prospects of the country (McAllister 2003). *International relations*, *foreign affairs* and *foreign policy* operate as pivotal 'keywords' framing the proliferation of public talk around the subject (Walt 1998; Williams 1976). A key theme within this discourse is the matter of the appropriate balance between the past and the future (Melleuish 1997). What emphasis, for example, should Australia place on consolidating its traditional and established connections with the United Kingdom and the United States of America (White 1981), as against seeking to strengthen newer and more tentative ties in Asia (Jones and Benvenuti 2006; Knight 2004)?

Table 1 reports findings from AuSSA 2005 on public receptiveness to the idea of Australia moving towards post-traditional networks of national ties; in other words, a more Asia-connected Australia. Two key findings are apparent here. The first is that respondents overwhelmingly view the prospect of Australia as increasingly linked with Asia as quite unproblematic, until the question is raised of it perhaps coming at the cost of traditional relationships. The kind of national tie with Asia that received the greatest endorsement was economic. 57 per cent of respondents agreed that

Australia should look to augment its economic links with Asia, while only 13 per cent disagreed. Cultural and political connections were also well supported, but a little less strongly. 44 per cent of respondents favored building up such ties, where 23 per cent were against this. On the question of developing new defense arrangements within Asia at the cost of conventional dealings with the United States of America, opinion was fairly evenly divided. 33 per cent of respondents endorsed this proposal, while 32 per cent opposed it.

The second main result is that there is only very modest support for greater levels of immigration at the current time. Data for the final question in the Table shows 24 per cent of respondents

supported an increase to immigration in the present climate, while 41 percent favored some reduction. This finding is noteworthy, in so far as ‘fear of Asianisation’ has been thought to be a

Table 1: Public receptiveness to a more Asia-connected Australia: frequency distributions

	strongly agree (%)	agree (%)	neither (%)	disagree (%)	strongly disagree (%)	N
- Australia should pursue greater economic ties with Asia	9	48	30	11	2	3708
- Australia should pursue greater cultural and political ties with Asia	7	37	33	19	4	3693
- Australia should concentrate on defence co-operation with our Asian neighbors rather than with the United States	5	28	35	26	6	1746
	increase a lot (%)	increase a little (%)	remain the same (%)	reduce a little (%)	reduce a lot (%)	N
- Do you think the number of immigrants to Australia nowadays should ...	6	18	35	22	19	3675

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key frame in Australia for the general public to draw upon in thinking about and making sense of immigration (Gamson 1992; Jupp 1997). In sum, these initial data seem to suggest that public receptiveness to the ideal of a more Asia-connected Australia is quite high, but fall away if this is seen to come at the cost of traditional national ties or implies an increase in the rate of Asian immigration.

Openness to different types of people and ways of life

Besides growing national interconnectedness, increasing mobility is a key quality associated with globalization. In effect, a key contention here is that as globalization deepens, the rate of individual

movement proliferates. From an Australian perspective then, what the globalization thesis is alerting us to here is the possibility that as we move deeper into the 21st century, we might expect to see more and more: (i) Australians traveling to other countries and living abroad, and (ii) non-Australians traveling to and living in Australia. What this growing mobility suggests then is an intensification of the likelihood of our prospects for mixing with different types of people and ways of life.

For some, the idea of strangers and strangeness spreading throughout our wider social milieu, reflective of the increasing proliferation of individual movement associated with globalization, may be experienced as unsettling, disturbing and maybe even anxiety inducing. An immediate reaction may be distance our selves from a growing atmosphere of social mixture, and to search for safety on ‘islands of similarity and sameness amidst the sea of variety and difference’ (Bauman 2003: 110). Such a retreat from difference may be apparent in the manifestation of a dedicated conviction to ‘stay put’ within Australian borders (rather than accepting the constant enticement to ‘travel abroad’), to ‘keep out’ of the bustling cities (for visits not just living), and to ‘find and seek refuge’ on atolls perceived to maintain traditionalism, such as Tasmania (Tasmania 2006). Yet, for others, the prospect of the growth of environments of social difference holds out the promise of everyday experience becoming more enlivening, fascinating and enthralling. We may choose to immerse ourselves in the settings from which the increasing possibilities for engaging with difference are thought to be emanating, say by way of deciding to travel abroad to an exotic location (i.e. Hong Kong, Tokyo), or by choosing to reside in the heart of a thriving metropolis (i.e. Sydney, Melbourne).

Table 2 presents data from AuSSA 2005 on the topics of what we believe makes for a good citizen, and how we think people who are strangers should be treated in an initial personal interaction with them. These results are interesting in that they provide us with some leverage on the question of how far do the general public in Australia today exhibit an ‘involvement with’ (as against ‘detachment from’) kind of reaction to the prospect of increased mixing with different types of people and ways of life. On the face of it, the data tell a consistent story. The large majority of respondents placed a strong valuation on being open to social mixture and difference in their relations with other people.

Table 2: Openness to different types of people and ways of life: frequency distributions

	very important (%)	important (%)	neither (%)	not important (%)	not at all important (%)	N
Question: There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally, how important is it:						
- to try and understand the reasoning of people with other opinions	45	40	10	3	2	1834
- to help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself	23	40	17	14	6	1843
Question: Now we have some questions about your relations with other people. How important is it for you personally?						
- when you meet people for the first time, how important is it that you do or say something to show that you have respect for them?	43	39	10	5	3	1851
- when you meet people you strongly disagree with, how important is it to do or say something to show you tolerate them?	18	41	17	16	8	1801

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In terms of what it takes to be a good citizen, the large majority of respondents reported that it is important to try and respect people who think differently to our selves (85 per cent), and to help people they don't personally know in other countries who are worse off than them selves (63 per cent). With respect to our relations with other people upon meeting them for the first time (strangers), there was a similar response pattern for our participants. Again, it was the bulk of respondents who indicated that it is important for them personally to say or do something to the stranger to demonstrate that we regard them with respect (82 per cent) and tolerance (59 per cent).

In essence, these data suggest that a solid majority of our respondents personally ascribe value to engaging with social mixture and difference. However, it is important to keep in mind that they tell us a little less about the extent to which people actually convert such principled beliefs into practice in those concrete real life situations where we come into contact, either face-to-face or through the mass media, with difference, perceived strangeness and far-away people and places.

Distinguishing public and personal attitudes towards globalization

In the results reported thus far, we have approached attitude to globalization as comprised of two distinct dimensions. We now turn to the AuSSA 2005 data, and ask is this distinction evident in public attitudes or is the distinction rather more of an analytical one? Are the public and personal dimensions of attitudes to globalization instead perhaps strongly interconnected?

Table 3 presents some evidence on this issue, showing the results of a multivariate statistical analysis. The analysis is based on closely scrutinizing the patterns of answers respondents gave to the eight questions presented in Table 1 and 2 for the presence of underlying regularities. The statistical technique used to do this is known as factor analysis. While the statistics underlying the technique are quite complex, the logic of the method is more readily understandable. In effect, what factor analysis does is identify subgroups of 'like' questions within a larger group. Question sub groups are identified by factor analysis on the basis of respondents having answered them in similar ways. A key job of the researcher is to look at the question sub groups delineated by factor analysis, and to consider whether it is possible to interpret them in a meaningful way. The key here is being able to make a plausible case for a question sub grouping implying a single unifying idea.

The factor analysis results under consideration here present a relatively straightforward solution. The technique identified two clearly emergent underlying factors. This is observable when we run our eyes down the two columns of data. Items one thru four can be seen to comprise one dimension. (Corresponding loadings on factor one ranged between .57 and .86). Item five thru eight made up a second dimension. (Associated loadings on factor two fell between .52 and .76). The two question sets identified by the factor analysis map squarely onto the matching groupings in Tables 1 and 2. What this finding suggests is that Australians make sense of the idea of

Table 3: Factor analysis: public and personal changes connected with the idea of globalization

	Orthogonal rotation	
	Factor 1	Factor 2
(i) Australia should pursue greater cultural and political ties with Asia	.86	-.07
(ii) Australia should pursue greater economic ties with Asia	.83	-.01
(iii) Number of Immigrants to Australia nowadays should be increased	.65	-.16
(iv) Australia should concentrate of defense co-operation with Asia	.57	-.06
(v) when meet people, show respect for them at first encounter	.06	.76
(vi) when meet people, show tolerance of disagree at first encounter	-.03	.75
(vii) Important for self to try and understand people with other opinions	-.14	.63
(viii) Important for self to help people in the rest of the world worse off than me	-.36	.52
Eigenvalue	2.59	1.56
Variance explained (per cent)	32.4	19.5
Cronbach's alpha	0.71	0.61
Number of cases	1503	

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globalization at distinct levels: as a public matter to do with shifting relations between nations, institutions, and ways of life, and as a personal issue infusing everyday experiences of difference. The question of the relationship between these discrete layers in the thinking is the subject of the next section of the Chapter.

The relationship between public and personal attitudes to globalization

Is there an association between public and personal attitudes to globalization among Australians? In other words, is there evidence of a relationship between how people orient themselves to the kinds of changes to national connections and individual relations associated with the globalization

thesis? Table 4 provides us with some leverage on this question. The data displayed here shows the association between receptiveness to post-traditional networks of national ties and openness to

Table 4: Openness to different types of people and ways of life by receptiveness to networks of national ties: crosstabular analysis (column per cent)

Openness to different types of people and ways of life	Receptiveness to an Asia-connected Australia			
	Endorse (%)	Neither (%)	Oppose (%)	
High	30	24	13	
Moderate	56	52	48	
Low	15	24	39	
Per cent	100	100	100	
N	396	744	363	$\chi^2=72.1, p<.001$

Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2005

different types of people and ways of life. The results are the product of us simply adding the four questions measuring each concept of interest, collapsing the resulting rank-order frequency distributions into three categories (1 = top 25 per cent, 2= middle 50 per cent, 3= bottom 25 per cent), and running a two-way table with the pair of new variables.

The findings show that there is a positive connection between public and personal dimensions of attitudes to globalization. In effect, this means that being receptive to the notion of an Asia-connected Australia is related with feeling open to social mixture and difference in personal relations with others. Furthermore, this relationship is moderately strong. Reading across the first row of Table 4, we can see that respondents who endorsed the idea of an increasingly Asia-connected Australia were 17 per cent more likely than respondents who opposed this notion to score ‘high’ on openness to social mixture and difference. Likewise, cutting down to row three, we can see an inverse situation. Compared to respondents who supported the prospect of Australia being connected more closely with Asia, those who were against this possibility were 24 per cent

more likely to score 'low' on openness to social mixture and difference. In sum, the Table presents a fairly clear-cut picture. How people orient themselves to the public and personal changes identified by globalization theory is linked. The more likely you are to favor Australian involvement with Asia, the more prone you are to be open to engaging with social mixture and difference in everyday life.

Attitudes towards globalization: social backgrounds, politics, mass media and travel

The focus in our scrutiny of the data so far has been on Australians in general. Now, we shift our analytic tack a little, and open up the question of subgroup differences. Our intention here is to allocate respondents into different categories of sociological interest, and to consider if and how these give rise to divergent appraisals of the kinds of social worlds promised by theorists of globalization. More precisely, it is our aim to develop a picture of the kinds of characteristics that divide people in terms of whether they view the social transformations foreshadowed by the globalization thesis with warm optimism or a cooler sense of doubt. In particular, we take a special interest in social background, political outlook, mass media usage and travel experiences as qualities that might be expected to go some way towards accounting for variation in sentiments to the social changes wrought by globalization (Bauman 2003, Calhoun 1991).

Table 5 shows the relationship between attitudes to the public and personal changes associated with globalization and a number of key sociological categories: age, education, income, religion, place of residence, gender, and birthplace. The first observation we would make is that none of these variables exhibited a consistent relationship with attitudes to both public and personal dimensions of globalization. While income and religion achieved a statistically significant relationship to both the dependent variable, in each case cross cutting effects were registered. The financially well-off, secularized respondents were distinguished (from poorer, religious respondents) by way of their greater propensity to endorse an increasingly Asia-connected Australia, and oppose greater openness to different types of people and ways of life. Turning to the public and personal dimensions of attitudes to globalization separately, two distinct sets of results were apparent. The first finding of interest was that university educated, overseas born, city dwellers stood apart from less educated, Australian born people living in rural & regional areas in

Table 5: Australian involvement with Asia and Openness to social mixture and difference, by social background: crosstabular analysis

	Receptiveness to an Asia-connected Australia			Openness to different types of people and ways of life		
Age Group	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
18 - 34	30%	51%	20%	21%	57%	22%
35 - 49	26%	50%	24%	20%	53%	27%
50 - 64	25%	47%	27%	21%	52%	27%
65 & over	25%	52%	23%	34%	47%	19%
	N=1607, $\chi^2=7.2$, p: ns			N=1692, $\chi^2=28.5$, p<.001		
Degree	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Yes	44%	47%	9%	25%	55%	20%
No	21%	51%	29%	23%	51%	26%
	N=1608, $\chi^2=106.8$, p<.001			N=1691, $\chi^2=5.4$, p: ns		
Income	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
High	42%	43%	14%	21%	54%	25%
Medium	28%	51%	21%	20%	54%	26%
Low	22%	49%	29%	28%	49%	22%
	N=1477, $\chi^2=39.0$, p<.001			N=1555, $\chi^2=15.5$, p<.01		
Religion	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Yes	24%	50%	26%	25%	51%	24%
No	30%	50%	20%	19%	54%	27%
	N=1603, $\chi^2=8.1$, p<.05			N=1688, $\chi^2=6.7$, p<.05		
Residence	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Capital City	29%	49%	21%	22%	54%	24%
Outside	21%	50%	29%	26%	48%	26%
	N=1605, $\chi^2=17.8$, p<.001			N=1692, $\chi^2=5.8$, p: ns		
Gender	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Female	26%	49%	25%	27%	54%	19%
Male	26%	50%	23%	19%	51%	30%
	N=1615, $\chi^2=0.9$, p: ns			N=1699, $\chi^2=36.0$, p<.001		
Birthplace	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Australia	23%	50%	27%	23%	52%	25%
Overseas	34%	51%	15%	26%	52%	22%
	N=1605, $\chi^2=31.0$, p<.001			N=1690, $\chi^2=2.2$, p: ns		

their stronger endorsement of an Asia-linked Australia. The second noteworthy result was that older females were distinguished from younger males by way of their greater openness towards different types of people and ways of life.

Table 6 reports how political disposition and mass media usage patterns shape individual attitudes about the public and personal dimensions of globalization. Political disposition exhibited a consistent relationship with both attitudinal dimensions. Respondents who were very interested in politics and often involved in discussing it were distinguished from respondents with little interest in politics and who spoke about it rarely (if ever), with respect to their greater propensity to endorse Australian involvement with Asia and express openness to different types of people and ways of life. It is noteworthy that political disposition held a particularly strong association with attitudes to the idea of a more Asia-tied Australia. The stronger the political engagement exhibited by the respondent, the greater the likelihood was this vision of national interconnectedness to be supported.

With respect to media usage patterns, the relationship with attitudes to globalization was a little less clear cut. What was consistent was the salience of ABC/SBS television. Respondents who used these television channels as their main base of daily information were marked by their strong inclination, to endorse increased Australian involvement with Asia and to be receptive to social mixture and difference, relative to respondents who nominated other media sources. Within this ABC/SBS viewing sub group, 40 per cent endorsed the idea of a more Asia-connected Australia, while 28 per cent exhibited a high level of openness to social mixture and difference. Of interest, respondents who relied primarily on the Internet as the key source of day-to-day information were distinguished by a greater proclivity to favor an even more Asia-tied Australia (42 per cent). Yet, this pattern at the public level did not flow over into the personal realm. The degree of openness to social mixture and difference exhibited by the dedicated Internet users was less marked and unexceptional, in comparison with other subgroups.

Turning to the question of the influence of Internet usage more specifically, the results confirmed its relative inconsequentiality for openness to social mixture and difference. Indeed, there is even a little evidence to suggest that with higher rates of Internet usage we witness a weakening of

Table 6: Australian involvement with Asia and Openness to social mixture and difference, by politics and mass media: crosstabular analysis

	Receptiveness to an Asia-connected Australia			Openness to different types of people and ways of life		
Political interest						
	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Very interested	39%	41%	20%	28%	49%	23%
Fairly interested	29%	48%	23%	26%	54%	20%
Not interested	18%	54%	28%	20%	51%	29%
	N=1617, $\chi^2=43.3$, $p<.001$			N=1700, $\chi^2=21.6$, $p<.001$		
Political talk						
	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Often	41%	37%	22%	30%	50%	20%
Sometimes	28%	49%	23%	25%	54%	21%
Rarely/Never	19%	54%	27%	20%	50%	30%
	N=1616, $\chi^2=42.3$, $p<.001$			N=1701, $\chi^2=26.4$, $p<.001$		
Main source Of daily info						
	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
ABC/SBS	40%	46%	14%	28%	53%	19%
Commercial	13%	52%	34%	22%	50%	28%
Newspaper	24%	53%	23%	20%	54%	26%
Internet	42%	42%	16%	21%	49%	30%
Family/Friends	11%	54%	36%	14%	59%	28%
	N=1612, $\chi^2=151.8$, $p<.001$			N=1701, $\chi^2=20.9$, $p<.01$		
Internet usage						
	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Several times a day	35%	27%	17%	18%	54%	28%
Once a day at most	27%	51%	50%	25%	52%	22%
Do not use	17%	23%	33%	24%	50%	26%
	N=1609, $\chi^2=49.6$, $p<.001$			N=1695, $\chi^2=11.1$, $p<.05$		

Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2005

receptiveness to different types of people and ways of life. (Openness to social mixture and difference fell from 24 per cent among non-users to 18 per cent among regular users). Yet, looking back to the political level, we see a much stronger pattern in the opposing direction, with regular

Internet users (35 percent) being distinguished from non- users (17 per cent) by way of their much greater propensity to endorse the idea of an increasingly Asia-linked Australia.

Table 7 presents data on if and how travel patterns shape attitudes to globalization. We take a particular interest here in the specific influence of travel to Asia (as against more traditional destinations for Australians such as continental Europe, the US and New Zealand) (Sensis 2005). The data distinguishes between whether the purpose of the visit was for business or pleasure. In this way, we can see if the specific sub-group of respondents who have chosen actively to visit Asia (as against perhaps having been obliged to do so to fulfill a work commitment such as a face-to-face meeting with a business partner), exhibit a distinct social outlook. The results show that visiting Asia matters for the public dimension of attitudes to globalization. Respondents who had been to Asia for a holiday were powerfully distinguished from those who had not in the level of support they lent to the notion of an increasingly Asia connected Australia. They were twice as likely to endorse the proposition (35 per cent as against 17 per cent). Having been to Asia for business or work was also associated with endorsement of the idea, but less strongly so (34 per cent compared to 25 per cent). Furthermore, respondents who had never visited Asia were only half as likely as those who had to give their backing to an increasingly Asia-tied Australia (16 per

Table 7: Australian involvement with Asia and Openness to social mixture and difference, by visited Asia: crosstabular analysis

	Receptiveness to an Asia-connected Australia			Openness to different types of people and ways of life		
<hr/>						
Holiday	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Yes	35%	49%	16%	25%	52%	23%
No	17%	51%	32%	22%	52%	26%
<hr/>			<hr/>			
	N=1628, $\chi^2=94.2$, $p<.001$			N=1714, $\chi^2=2.0$, $p: ns$		
Business/Work	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Yes	34%	52%	14%	20%	54%	26%
No	25%	49%	26%	24%	52%	24%
<hr/>			<hr/>			
	N=1628, $\chi^2=17.1$, $p<.001$			N=1714, $\chi^2=2.2$, $p: ns$		
Never visited	<u>Endorse</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Yes	16%	50%	34%	23%	52%	25%
No	34%	50%	16%	24%	52%	24%

Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2005

cent versus 34 per cent). Yet, compared to this pattern of results, whether or not Asia had been visited was found to be of virtually no consequence for the personal dimension of globalization attitudes. Quite simply, the data showed that having undertaken this kind of travel was unassociated with the degree of openness respondents expressed towards different types of people and ways of life.

Conclusion

In this Chapter we have explored Australians attitudes towards two dimensions of globalization: increasing national interconnectedness and expanding individual mobility. Using data from AuSSA 2005, a number of patterns were discovered about the state of public attitudes towards the idea of an increasingly Asia-connected Australia, and the notion of everyday life being more and more infused with social mixture and difference. A first result of interest was that there was a significant level of mass support for (i) Australia becoming more closely tied to Asia, and (ii) we as individuals being more engaged with different types of people and various ways of life. Yet, while well endorsed in the abstract, the results suggested that degree of approval for both these propositions started to fall away when more concrete questions of ‘at what cost’ were raised (i.e. ‘stronger Asian ties are a good thing, but not if it means a weaker defense relationship with the United States, or an increase in immigrant numbers’). In this sense, the findings perhaps suggest that Australians today embrace the idea of globalisation more than they do the reality.

A second noteworthy finding from the Chapter was the validity of distinguishing between the public and personal realms of attitudes to globalization. In other words, *the relations of the nation with others* and *the relations of the self with others* seem to be two distinct prisms through which respondents make sense of globalization. This might be seen as a useful insight insofar as emerging research on attitudes to globalization has concentrated mainly on the ‘public issues’ dimension. This work has been concerned with analyzing the social bases of popular opinion about *international relations, foreign affairs* and *foreign policy* (Bean 2002; Holton and Phillips 2001;

Mughan *et al.* 2003; Vowles and Bean 2006). Yet, distinct from attitudes to what the nation should do in the face of deepening national connectedness, there is the related question of how individuals orienting themselves to the idea of living in a world increasingly shaped by widespread mobility and growing cross-border connections. How is the individual responding to the environments of social diversity and difference that theories of globalization suggest will increasingly instill modern city life today? Withdrawal into gated communities and resentment towards immigrants are two prevalent forms of personal reaction to the globalization on the urban landscape (Bauman 2003). Yet there is much more to be said about responses, demanding more sophisticated forms of analysis that make sense of data that is quite complex.

While they are distinct attitudinal dimensions, a third interesting result from the analysis was that public and personal attitudes towards globalization often go together and complement each other. People who endorse an increasingly Asia-tied Australia are also likely to personally value engaging with social mixture and difference. This finding is noteworthy because it draws our attention to the links between different layers of attitudes to globalization. We might think of people who make this link in a positive way as supportive of the spread of globalization, and those who make it in a negative way as opposed to the growth of the phenomenon.

The findings showed that different facets of individual background and experience matter for whether globalisation is endorsed or opposed. Politics and the media were revealed to have quite marked effects. High levels of political engagement and dedicated viewing of ABC/SBS were two qualities associated with embracing globalization at public and personal level. We might refer to these respondents as exhibiting *cosmopolitanism*, in the sense that they reflect the alignment of attitudes to the local and the national ‘as a result of interaction with the global ‘ (Delanaty 2006: 36). In effect, there is a preparedness to engage with otherness at the level of both nation and self (Hannerz 1996). On the other hand, low levels of political interest and active viewing of commercial media were related with rejecting both dimensions of attitudes to globalization. We suggest using the term *steadfast nationalists* to represent these respondents. They are oriented strongly towards what are seen as distinctively national symbols, attitudes and ways of life.

The results suggested the type of respondents who supported the two different dimensions of globalisation were really quite different from each other. With respect to endorsing increased national interconnectedness (a more Asia-linked Australia), the findings revealed greatest support among people who are financially well-off, university educated, secular, overseas born, city dwellers, regular internet users and had visited Asia. Regarding valuing openness to different types of people and ways of life, a quite dissimilar set of qualities distinguished the most favorable disposed respondents. Here, it was people who were older, financially poor, devout, and females who stood apart with respect to exhibiting a higher level of support for globalisation. We refer to these groups as *cautious inter-nationalists*. One position is grounded in an endorsement of transnational institutions, the other in a willingness to accept other peoples.

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